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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
CENTRAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, a corporation, and EARL S.
CHILD, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

W. S. BRIMHALL, Commissioner of
Financial Institutions; FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION, a bank
holding company; and FIRST SECURITY STATE BANK OF
SPRINGVILLE, an unincorporated
association,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
12636

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS-CENTRAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY
and EARL S. CHILD, et al.
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO DECIDE "\i\THETHER RESPONDENT,
FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION, IS IN VIOLATION OF UTAH BRANCH BANKING LAW BY THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF FIRST SECURITY STATE
BANK OF SPRINGVILLE.
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Respondents in their brief to this Court raise for the
first time the contention that the Commissioner of Financial Institutions and the Utah courts do not possess
subject matter jurisdiction to rule upon the branch bank.
ing issue before this Court. Respondents claim that under
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Congress gave
the Federal Reserve Board the exclusive jurisdiction to
decide bank holding company matters and, therefore, no
Utah authority can deny an application by a holding company for a state charter on the grounds that the applicant
is in violation of a statute of the State of Utah. To support their contention, respondents rely heavily on the case
of Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379
U.S. 411, 13 Law Ed. 2d 386 (1965). A careful reading of
the Whitney case makes it clear that the Supreme Court
did not go so far as to take away from the states their
right to deny an application for a state bank charter by
ba.."lk. holding company on the grounds that it violates the
state branch banking law.

Whitney involved a national bank, not a state bank
as is involved in the present case. The national bank, in an
effort to avoid the restrictions of the branch banking laws
of Louisiana, formed a holding company and adopted a
plan to organize a new national bank. This plan was ap·
proved by the Federal Reserve Board. Thereafter, Louisi·
ana enacted a statute making it unlawful for a bank hold·
ing company to open for business any bank not presently
open for business. Three state chartered banks
judicial relief from the Federal Reserve Board decision m

...
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the Court of Appeals. The state chartered banks also
brought a suit in the District Court for the District of
Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief against the Comptroller of the Currency to prevent
him from issuing the requisite certificate of authority for
the new national bank. A permanent injunction was
issued and upheld by the Court of Appeals on the ground
that the plan was solely an attempt to avoid Louisiana
branch banking law and invalid.
The Supreme Comt reve:sed, holding that under the
Bank Holding Company Act the District Court had no
jurisdiction to revie"v the order of the Federal Reseive
Board.
In reaching its decision the court reviewed the history of the Bank Holding Company Act which showed
that Congress had no intention of giving the Comptroller
of the Currency a veto over the Federal Reserve Board.
"Moreover, the Bank Holding Company Act
makes the Board's approval of a holding company
arrangement binding upon the Comptroller. A provision designed to make the decision of the Comptroller, rather than that of the Board, final was
rejected when the Act was being framed. 101 Cong.
Rec. 8186-8187. This legislative history clearly indicates that Congress had no intention to give the
Comptroller a veto over the Board in such cases.
It follows that it is the exclusive function of the
Board to act in such cases and contests must be
pursued before it, not before the Comptroller. This
position is also supported by legislative history
which shows that the Congress rejected a proposal
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for a de novo review in the district courts of Board
decisions on holding company proposals. . .."
The court went on to state that the procedure fol.
lowed by the respondents therein was similar to that rejected by Congress which had instead provided review in
the Court of Appeals, and concluded that these congres.
sional actions showed that a party dissatisfied with the
Board's decision must seek review in the Court of Appeals
and not instigate a new action in the Federal District
Court.
"We think these congressional actions point
clearly to the conclusion that it intended that
challenges to Board approval of the organization
and operation of a new bank by a holding company
be pursued solely as provided in the statute." (em·
phasis supplied)
The court went on to state that the Board's determina·
tions may not be collaterally attacked in the District
Court by a suit against the Comptroller. The court at
least twice in its opinion (379 U.S. 411 at pages 420 &
423) limited its judicial ruling to "challanges ro Board
approval" and "those dissatisfied with the Board's ruling."
Nowhere in the opinion did the court conclude, as respond·
ents here contend, that state authorities have no jurisdic·
tion to hold a state bank charter application by a holding
company to be a violation of state law.
Under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, states
are allowed to regulate bank holding companies:
"The enactment by the Congress of this chap·
ter shall not be construed as preventing any state
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from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which
it now has or may hereafter have with respect to
banks, bank holding companies, and subsidiaries
thereof." 12 U.S.C.A. 1846.
Under this statute the states may even go so far as to
prohibit the formation of bank holding companies within
their borders. Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New
Orleans, supra. note 5; Trans-Nebra.Eka Co. 49 Fed. Res.
Bul. 633 (1963); Commercial National Bank of Little Rock
u. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 451
F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1971).
Under 12 U.S.C.A. 1846 the states may pass legislation to regulate, limit, or even prohibit bank holding companies, but under respondents' position, once the legislation is passed, the states have no power to interpret or
enforce it. Appellants submit that such a position is untenable and is a belated effort on the part of respondents
to avoid confrontation in a Utah court with the serious
banking problems for this state that are involved in this
case.
The effect on the State of Utah from a ruling that
Utah authorities have no jurisdiction to determine
whether a state bank charter application by a bank holding company violates state law is clear-Utah would have
to become an advocate before the Federal Reserve Board
in many cases in order to protect the state's rights. Using
the present case as an example, the Commissioner still
would have had to have taken full testimony on the
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branching issue to have been in a position to have decided
the issue. If the Commissioner had decided the application
violated Utah Code Annotated §7-3-6 or any other provi.
sion of Utah banking law, he then would have had to
switch roles from Administrator to advocate in order to
present Utah's case to the Federal Reserve Board. Such
a result is clearly not within the mandate of the Whitney
decision, Nealey v. Brown, 284 A.2d 480 (Me. 1971) to
the contrary.
Utah Code Annotated §7-1-26 sets forth a compre·
hensive scheme governing applications to e2tablish a state
bank in the State of Utah. The statutory scheme in es·
sence consists of two steps-the procedure for filing an
application before the Commissioner, including the criteria
under which he shall approve or deny the application, and
the procedure for judicial review of the Commissioner's
decision by an aggrieved applicant or protestant. Under
the statute, the reviewing court has the power to hold
unlawful and set aside any decisions of the Commissioner
found not to be in accordance with the law. Thus, under
the statute it is the function of the Utah court3 to decide
questions of law where there is a dispute as to what the
law is dur'mg the proceedings before the Commissioner.
In the present case there was a dispute as to the appliell·
bility of Utah's branch banking statute to holding corn·
panies during the proceedings before the Commissioner,
but respondent, First Security Corporation, applied to the
Federal Reserve Board prior to resolution of that issue by
the Utah courts. Appellants would submit that First
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Security should have allowed the Utah courts to resolve
this issue prior to submitting its application to the Board
instead of "putting the cart before the horse" by applying
to the Federal Reserve Board and placing the Board in the
position of applying state law prior to the time the state
courts have determined what the state law is. The entire
statutory scheme of §7-1-26 would be subverted if an applicant could take issues involving Utah law to the Federal
Reserve Board prior to the determination of such issues
by Utah courts and then contend the Utah court has no
because the Federal Reserve Board has decid:•d the issue!
Respondents, m their brief, urge this court not to
render a decision contrary to the expert decision of the
Federal Reserve Board in this matter. (The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reseve System approved the
application of respondents by a 4 to 3 vote on November
25, 1970.) However, respondents fail t.o mention that the
Board did not rule on the issue of whether First Security
violated the provisions of §7-3-6 of Utah Code Annotated
by the establishment of First Security State Bank of
Springville. If this court declines to decide the branch
banking issue, respondents will have managed to avoid
facing this issue completely. No authority will have decided whether First Security Corporation is subject to
Utah branch banking law, a very important question to
the b:lnking industry of Utah.
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The law on the branch banking issue has again bee
.
n
se out m Commercial National Bank of Little Rock v.
Governors of the Federal Reserve System., supra.,
a decIS1on reported after appellants submitted their origin.
al briefs:

t

"[A] banking institution cannot avoid state
branch banking restrictions merely because it is
in fact carrying out branch banking." at 89.
The Commercial court with substantial reservations
found the unitary type operation did not exist which was
unlawful under the Arkansas branch banking law. In reviewing the evidence the court stated:
"In this case there is substantial evidence in
the record to indicate the relationship between
F ABCO [the bank holding company] and its subsidiaries did not represent the kind of UPitary oper·
ation that was unlawful under Arkansas branch
banking ... They will continue to have separate
and independent board of directors, no members
of which are common to both boards. Both banks
will contninue to be managed. by local officers . ··
Finally, there is nothing to indicate that !hey will
be identified as one institution by the public. These
basic facts are undisputed."
The facts in the present case are just the opposite and
are facts which respondents failed to note in their suggestion that the two cases were almost identical.
There was little evidence in Commercial to support a
claim that the defendant holding company violated the
Arkansas branch banking law, yet the court in the Com·
mercial case was reluctant to deny the protestants' claim·
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In that case if one of the ba..'1ks accepted deposiU; for the
other bank, or if the common identity with First Security
as the record discloses in the present case were present,
there can be no doubt that the court would have reached
a contrary result, which appellants urge the Court to do
in this case.
CONCLUSION
This case presenU; to the court the important question of whether First Security Corporation can organize
and operate First Security State Bank of Springville as
a de facto branch of First Security without being in violation of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 7-3-6,
governing Utah branch banking. The answer to this question will be of great importance to the entire banking industry of the state of Utah. RespondenU; have suggested
that outside authorities are best qualified to decide this
issue and thus urge this court to extend the scope of the
Whitney decision in order to deny Utah authorities jurisdiction to interpret Utah law. AppellanU; submit that
Utah authorities are better qualified than ouU;ide author-
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ities to interpret questions concerning Utah law which
are important to the state of Utah and that this court
clearly has jurisdiction to do so in this case.
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